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POLICY CHALLENGE
The challenge for the ETS is that distributional concerns should not out-
weigh efficiency targets and the need for transparency. Our indicators
suggest that countries with the
highest abatement burden are
already compensated through the
allocation of free emission rights and
revenues from the auctioning of
allowances. Additional exceptions
that would challenge the efficiency of
the ETS are not generally justified.
This is particularly true for free
allowances. Thus, the shift from the
allocation of free allowances towards
the allocation of auction revenues
should be speeded up. This implies
reducing the high number of sectors
entitled to free allowances.
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SUMMARYIn its third phase (2013-20) the European Union's emissions
trading system (ETS) will issue allowances for around two billion tonnes of
CO2 equivalent each year. The emission rights are valued at around €30-35
billion at current prices, between one-half and two-thirds of the amount the
EU spends on the Common Agricultural Policy. The redistributive effects of
the allocation of emission allowances are therefore potentially significant.
Quantitative indicators for the relative degree to which individual countries
will be affected by the ETS suggest that economic consequences for the
member states will be quite different. By comparing the indicators for each
country with that country's initial allocation, we find, however, that coun-
tries with less favourable initial conditions are largely compensated.
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1. Furthermore, the
decision on whether or
not to increase the EU's
2020 emissions reduc-
tion target from 20 per-
cent to 30 percent is
still on the political
agenda.
2. A review of macro-
models is to be found in
Oberndorfer et al
(2006) and Dannen-
berg et al (2008). One
example is the the
E3ME model of 42
industrial sectors with
the disaggregation of
energy and environ-
ment industries. This
was used for the impact
assessment for the
2009 Climate Package.
THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS
TRADING SYSTEM (ETS) will enter
its third phase (2013-20) in a sig-
nificantly changed form compared
to its first and second phases
(2005-07 and 2008-12). The
scheme requires about 13,000
industrial installations and power
plants to surrender an allowance
for each tonne of carbon dioxide
they emit. The total number of
allowances is capped. During the
first two phases, installations were
given free allowances on the basis
of complex national rules. As some
participants emit more than their
initial allocation, while others emit
less, a relatively liquid market for
allowances has developed. In the
third phase, the ETS will expand to
cover new installations and green-
house gases, and the method of
allocating EU emission allowances
(EUAs) will be modified. The
debate on the technical details of
the third phase is ongoing
1.
The ETS has significant economic
effects. The European Commission
(2010) argues that the implemen-
tation of climate legislation will
cost 0.32 percent of GDP up to
2020. Because of differing initial
conditions, member states feel the
impact of the ETS differently. Some
governments worry that their
industries will have to shoulder
more than their fair share of the
burden. Compensation mecha-
nisms have thus been introduced,
relying to a certain degree on polit-
ical discretion, such as the rules
for allocating free allowances. As a
result, the ETS is becoming one of
the EU’s policies with the greatest
economic impact. By issuing
allowances with an annual value
of €30-35 billion the ETS will be on
a scale comparable to the Common
Agricultural Policy (about €60
billion) and the Structural and
Cohesion Funds (€30-50 billion).
This Policy Brief summarises, in
the next section, the main
cost/benefit factors that will come
into play on the national level in
the third phase of the ETS. From
these, we develop indicators for
the relative degree to which indi-
vidual countries will be affected by
the ETS. We then compare our find-
ings on the sharing of costs and
benefits with the initial allocation
of allowances and the division of
auction revenues between coun-
tries, to see if the countries most
affected by the ETS are appropri-
ately compensated. We conclude
with some policy lessons.
1 INDICATORS
The economic effects of the ETS
can be split into five main compo-
nents: (1) the cost at which a
country can abate carbon emis-
sions; (2) the effect the carbon
price has on the profits of carbon-
intensive industry; (3) the effect
the carbon price has on domestic
and industrial users of carbon-
intensive products (in particular
electricity); (4) the effect the car-
bon price has on other production
factors; and (5) the fiscal benefit a
country can realise by generating
additional revenues from the auc-
tioning of emission allowances.
For most of the components, there
are extensive models that calcu-
late the individual or joint effects
2.
However, to the author’s knowl-
edge, no model explicitly includes
all dimensions, with the objective
of comparing the country-level
costs and benefits of the ETS.
Our approach therefore assesses
country-level effects using indica-
tors derived from economic intu-
ition. Each indicator compares a
cost/benefit arising from the ETS
in an individual country with the
corresponding cost/benefit for the
EU27. Thus, countries with lower
than average costs in some areas
and higher than average benefits
in others are 'winners', while
below-average benefit or above-
average cost countries are rela-
tively worse off ('losers'). We
analyse the relative costs of the
ETS for seven countries represent-
ing different regions and economic
situations: France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the
United Kingdom.
1.1 Potential for exporting
allowances
The amount by which an economy
can reduce its greenhouse-gas
emissions is a key factor in its ten-
dency to import or export emission
allowances. A country will likely
reduce emissions overall as long
as the cost for an additional
reduced unit is below the carbon
price. It will then either export
allowances to maximise profits or
import allowances in order to meet
its target. Thus, the more an econ-
omy can abate, and the lower the
reduction cost, the more net
revenues it can generate from
exporting (or not importing)
allowances.
Depending on their industrial
structure and development level,
countries differ substantially inIS EUROPEAN CLIMATE POLICY THE NEW CAP?
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3. For interested read-
ers we for example refer
to the work of McKinsey
(2010) for Poland.
4. As the raw data are
publicly unavailable we
rely on the polynomial
approximation of the
cost curves used by
Anger (2009).
their potential for reducing emis-
sions at low cost. Countries with a
high share of industry that can cut
its emissions inexpensively by
improving production processes or
substituting inputs can reduce
emissions cheaply.
Indicator (Figure 1): The abate-
ment potential, ie the volume of
emissions in megatons (Mt) that a
country could cut, depends on the
carbon price. This abatement
potential is notoriously difficult to
assess, and making a bottom-up
estimate of the abatement poten-
tial for different countries is
beyond the scope of this Policy
Brief
3.I n s t e a d ,  w e  b a s e  o u r
assessment on the marginal
abatement-cost assumptions used
in the POLES model that has been
used for the ETS impact assess-
ment (Commission, 2008)
4.
Result:French, Italian and Spanish
abatement costs are among the
highest, while those in central
Europe are comparatively low.
Thus, at a carbon price of 30 €/t,
Germany, the UK and central
Europe might profitably sell hun-
dreds of millions of carbon permits
to Spain, Italy and France.
1.2 Direct vulnerability
Putting a price on carbon implies
higher production costs for goods
and services whose production
involves emitting greenhouse
gases. Consequently, the first
component of carbon competitive-
ness is the amount of carbon
needed to produce one unit of
added value in a sector or country.
The more carbon-intensive an
industry, the more it will be
a country’s added value by the
added value at stake in the sector.
The added value at stake is an esti-
mate of the reduction in the price-
cost margin in a given sector due
to a carbon price of 20€/t. The cor-
responding values for each sector
are taken from estimates by
Umweltbundesamt (2008) for
Germany. To give one example: in
Germany, the added value of the
textiles finishing sector in 2007
was €429 million. This repre-
sented 0.02 percent of German
added value. According to Umwelt-
bundesamt(2008), the maximum
direct effect of a 20€/t carbon
price would be a loss of about 1.6
percent of added value in this sec-
Energy-intensive sectors
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Source: Anger (2009) and author’s calculations.
Figure 1: Marginal abatement potential at 15€/t and 30€/t
affected by the carbon price. The
second component is the ability of
a country to pass through cost
shocks to trading partners. If car-
bon prices rise, some sectors with
low demand elasticity (eg electric-
ity) will be able to pass through
the cost to their customers, while
sectors with higher demand elas-
ticity (eg short-haul aviation) will
have to accept decreasing
turnover and/or margins.
Indicators (Figure 2): To assess
how vulnerable an economy is to
the pricing of carbon, we estimate
the gross added value that is at
stake. To compute this indicator,
we multiply each sector's share of
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Source: Eurostat, Umweltbundesamt (2008) and author’s calculations.
Figure 2: Vulnerability indicatorb
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5. As electricity is
responsible for about
half of ETS emissions.
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tor. Thus, from the textiles finish-
ing sector, Germany would lose
0.0003 percent of its added value
(0.02 percent times 1.6 percent).
We sum up these losses for the 20
most-affected sectors for each
country. This gives a loss of 0.15
percent of added value for Ger-
many and 0.25 percent for Spain.
Then we divide the individual coun-
try's loss by the mean loss of
added value to see which coun-
tries are more and which are less
affected due to their industrial
structure. This constitutes our vul-
nerabilityindicator.
Result: Due to their industrial
structures, Hungary, Poland and
Spain could lose a higher share of
their added value than France,
Italy or the UK. In Poland and
Spain, this is in part due to a high
share of cement production in the
added value. This may in part be a
consequence of our 2007 data
coinciding with a construction
boom in both countries. However,
even when ignoring the cement
sector, the ordering of countries
remains constant.
1.3 Indirect vulnerability
The cost of emission allowances
for producing intermediate goods
(such as electricity) are passed
through to the next stage of the
value chain (such as aluminium
smelting). Consequently, coun-
tries generating a lot of added
value by processing non-substi-
tutable carbon-intensive interme-
diate goods will be worse off. It is
widely agreed that the main pass-
through effect happens with elec-
tricity
5. In distributional terms, one
can distinguish two effects: low-
carbon electricity producers will
gain windfall profits from higher
electricity prices (France), while
industries consuming high levels
of electricity (Poland) will lose out.
Consequently, we propose two
indicators (Figure 3): (1) electric-
ity intensity of industry (industry
electricity consumption divided by
industrial GDP); and (2) carbon
intensity of the power sector.
Result:German and Polish electric-
ity generation is particularly 'dirty'.
That is, it generates less electricity
per tonne of CO2 than the EU aver-
age. In addition, the Polish and
Spanish economies are more vul-
nerable to higher electricity costs,
because they need more electric-
ity to produce a unit of added value
in their industrial sectors.
1.4 Write-down of domestic
assets
Member states are endowed with
natural resources to different
degrees. Due to emission caps,
demand will fall in Europe for
resources that generate high
emissions when processed. The
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Source: IEA, Eurostat and author’s calculations. * France needs four times less CO2 to produce
a unit of electricity than the EU average. For presentational purposes we capped the figure.
Figure 3: Pass-through effect
price of these resources can be
expected to fall if they cannot eas-
ily be exported. This is particularly
true for coal. By contrast, natural
gas demand in Europe will
increase as a consequence of a
modest carbon price. Thus, Euro-
pean natural-gas producers will be
able to charge higher prices.
Finally, the value of a highly
skilled workforce is increasing,
because skilled employees have
more capability to invent, imple-
ment and adapt to less carbon-
intensive production processes. 
Our three indicators (Table 1 and
Figure 4) are the self-sufficiency
rates for natural gas, coal import
dependency compared to the EU
average, and the share of popula-
tion with tertiary education.
Result:The increasing value of nat-
ural gas is good news for the gas-
exporting UK, while the decreasing
value of coal will result in a deteri-
oration of the external position of
coal-exporting Poland. The below-
average share of the population
with tertiary education in Hungary,
Italy and Poland indicates a below-
average ability to cope with theb
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ture' economies – France, Ger-
many and the UK – have higher
benefits and lower costs than the
EU average, while Hungary, Poland,
and Spain face above-average
costs and below-average benefits
from ETS participation. This
echoes the conventional wisdom
that the more advanced an econ-
omy, the less energy and carbon it
requires to generate added value,
and highlights the potential need
to compensate some economies
for their participation.
2 COMPENSATION THROUGH
INITIAL ALLOCATION?
The costs and benefits that we
have discussed are the first
aspect of the ETS's distributional
effects. The second is linked to the
way emission allowances are allo-
cated to ETS participants. As
Table 1: Share of high skilled relative
to EU27 average
France 114%
Germany 105%
Hungary 79%
Italy 58%
Poland 118%
Spain 84%
United Kingdom 133%
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations.
Table 2: Indicative table for indicators
FR DE HU IT PL ES UK
Allowance export potential – + + – + – +
Direct vulnerability + – + – +
Indirect vulnerability + – +
Write-down of domestic assets – – +
Double dividend +
10
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Gas self sufficiency relative to EU27
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%
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations.
Figure 4: Energy self sufficiency
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Figure 5: State share compared to EU average (2008)
sectoral change induced by limit-
ing carbon emissions.
1.5 Double dividend
A double dividend might occur as
other taxes are replaced by car-
bon-related revenues that are less
distorting than the previous taxes
(Goulder, 1995). In general, higher
tax revenues imply more distorting
taxes. Thus, the higher the state
share, the more helpful revenues
from carbon taxes (or the auction-
ing of emission rights) are for lim-
iting distortions. We therefore use
the 2008 state share compared to
the EU average as the indicator.
Result (Figure 5): In France the
additional income from auctioning
of allowances might help most to
reduce distorting taxes.
1.6 Summary
By its very nature this indicator
exercise is incomplete. Many
micro- and macro-level effects had
to be ignored and it is not possible
to assess the relative importance
of the individual effects. Neverthe-
less, we can conclude that some
countries are more adversely
affected than others. In Table 2 we
compile the indicators for the
countries under consideration. It is
striking that the EU's largest 'ma-tradable EUAs can be sold at mar-
ket prices, they are an exportable
good. The approximately two
billion EUAs issued each year have
a value of €32 billion at current
prices
6. Thus, the allocation of
allowances could compensate the
most affected economies.
For the third phase of the ETS,
there are three allocation princi-
ples: (1) selling a contingent of
allowances to the highest bidder
(auctioning), (2) free allocation of
some allowances to certain emit-
ters and (3) carry-over of unused
allowances from the previous trad-
ing phase. Furthermore, new EUA’s
might be created by converting
international emission permits
into European allowances.
2.1 Sharing of auction revenues
At the start of the third phase,
about 60 percent of the
allowances distributed to partici-
pants will be auctioned
7. The
remainder will be handed out for
free (see next section). Thus, at a
price of €16, the auction value in
2013 will be about €20 billion. 
Auction revenues will be distrib-
uted to member states according
to a key defined in the emission
trading directive (Directive
2009/29/EC). Most (88 percent)
revenues will be distributed
among member states on the
basis of their share of verified
emissions from ETS installations
in 2005. Of the remainder, 10 per-
cent will be distributed to the
least-wealthy states, and two per-
cent will be distributed as a 'Kyoto
bonus' to states that by 2005 had
already reduced their greenhouse
b
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6. The price for a 2014
EUA Future at the ECX in
December 2010 was
€16.
7. As the electricity sec-
tor is responsible for
approximately half of
the emissions that fall
under the ETS, and as
its allowances are to be
fully auctioned
(together with 15 per-
cent of the allowances
from aviation and 20
percent of the
allowances from the
non-leakage sector) it is
likely that more than
one billion EUAs will be
auctioned.
8. For each sector, a
value is established for
how much greenhouse
gas the 10 percent best-
performing installations
emit on average. The
number of free
allowances per installa-
tion is calculated from
this benchmark value,
the historic production
volume and a sector-
specific allocation fac-
tor. Thus, in 2013 an
installation producing
1000 units of a product
not subject to carbon
leakage, and whose 10
percent most carbon-
efficient producers emit
on average 1 tonne of
CO2 per unit, will obtain
800 allowances (1000
x 80 percent) for free,
regardless of whether
this particular producer
will actually emit 500 or
5000 tonnes of CO2.
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gas emissions by at least 20 per-
cent compared to their Kyoto pro-
tocol base year. 
Indicator (Figure 6): We propose
four criteria to measure the fair-
ness of the allocation of auction
revenues: the revenue share of
each country with that country's
share of EU27 GDP in 2008,
expected GDP in 2020, 2008 emis-
sions and the population in 2008.
Result: Poland and Hungary
receive relatively more auction
revenues than the EU27 average
while France, Italy and the UK
receive relatively low shares.
2.2 Distribution of free
allowances
Except for electricity generators,
all ETS participants receive a num-
ber of free allowances. Free alloca-
tion is based on sector-specific
benchmarks designed to reward
the most efficient operators in
each sector
8. The Commission
defined three different categories:
(1) aviation will receive 85 per-
cent of its benchmark for free; (2)
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Figure 6: Under/overallocation with respect to share of GDP,
population and emissions (2008 and 2020)
sectors exposed to carbon leakage
obtain 100 percent of their bench-
mark for free. This category
includes about 150 sectors, repre-
senting about 77 percent of manu-
facturing emissions, that might
shift production outside the EU in
response to carbon pricing; and
(3) all other installations will
obtain a linearly shrinking share
(2013: 80 percent to 2020: 30
percent) of the benchmark for free.
Thus, we propose two indicators
(Figure 7). The first approximates
the share of required allowances a
country might obtain for free.
Based on sectoral emission data
from 2008 (European Environ-
ment Agency) we analyse the
structure of emissions on a coun-
try level and estimate the emis-
sions falling under each of the four
categories: carbon leakage sectors
(>0 percent auctioning), aviation
(>15 percent auctioning), non-
leakage sectors (>20 percent auc-
tioning in 2013) and electricity
production (100 percent auction-
ing). We find that in 2013, about
40 percent of allowances in the
EU27 will be handed out for free
9.The second indicator measures the
importance of the leakage sector
relative to total manufacturing.
Results: Due to their less carbon-
intensive electricity generation,
France, Italy and Spain will receive
a much higher share of free
allowances than Germany or
Poland. In most countries in our
sample (especially Spain) the
leakage sector has a lower share in
total manufacturing than in the
EU27 average (42 percent in
turnover and 40 percent in
employment). Only Italy, which
has an above-average share in the
leakage sector (47 percent in
turnover and 47 percent in
employment), benefits from a
potentially disproportionate enti-
tlement to free allocations.
2.3 Banking of allowances
Excess EUAs from the ETS second
phase can be carried over to the
third phase, in contrast to the tran-
sition from the first to the second
phase, where this so-called 'bank-
ing' was precluded. Countries with
extraordinarily high over-alloca-
tions in the second phase can ben-
efit from their excess allowances
in the third phase.
Consequently our indicator (Fig-
ure 8) measures the allocation
factor (allowances allocated
divided by allowances used) in
each country relative to the alloca-
tion factor in the ETS in 2008-09.
Result: Phase II allowances were
significantly over-allocated to
France, Italy and Poland, but not to
Germany and the UK. Thus, the for-
mer countries have a greater
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9. It is likely that the real
number will be some-
what different, as most
installations are likely to
emit more than their
respective benchmark
value and we are unable
to distinguish sectors
within which some sub-
sectors are subject to
carbon leakage, while
others are not.
IS EUROPEAN CLIMATE POLICY THE NEW CAP?
Source: EEA, list of leakage sectors, Eurostat and author’s calculations.
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Figure 8: Relative over allocation, 2008-09
chance of carrying allowances
over to the third phase.
2.4 Summary
The ETS has disproportionate
adverse economic effects on Hun-
gary and Poland. These countries
are, however, also able to secure a
higher share of revenues from the
auctioning of allowances. By con-
trast, France and the UK, which
were relatively less affected eco-
nomically by the ETS than the
EU27 average, will receive a lower
share of auction revenues. This
suggests that countries seem to
be somewhat compensated for
their initial economic conditions. 
The only significant exception
might be Spain, which has been
adversely affected by the broad
definition of the carbon leakage
sector because it has a dispropor-
tionately low share of employment
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Figure 7(a): Share of free allowances in total  relative to EU27
Figure 7(b): Importance of the leakage sector relative to EU27b
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and turnover in carbon-leakage
industries. Consequently, other
countries with disproportionately
high shares in these industries will
receive higher shares of free
allowances. At the same time, the
total number of allowances to be
auctioned shrinks and Spain will
obtain lower allowance auction
revenues.
3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The cost of pricing carbon differs
substantially throughout Europe.
Some countries, such as France,
have significantly below-average
costs; others such as Poland seem
sion have been influenced by
redistribution (and possibly trans-
fer) motives. Thus, the ETS, which
can distribute allowances worth
€30-35 billion per year, is now one
of the largest redistribution
machines in the EU, and could
become an even bigger redistribu-
tion machine if a decision is made
to tighten the cap in order to
reduce emissions by 30 percent
by 2020
10. The big policy challenge
will be to speed up the shift from
the allocation of free allowances
towards the allocation of auction
revenues
11. The latter is essential
to ensure the transparency of
transfers and to increase the effi-
ciency of the ETS
12 in the decades
to come.
Research assistance by Anta
Ndoye and Hendrik Worschech is
gratefully acknowledged.
10. In this case, several
analysts predict a dou-
bling of the carbon price
which might bring the
value of the annual allo-
cation to about €60
billion, the same level as
current CAP spending.
11. For example, the
requirement to re-evalu-
ate in 2014 the vulnera-
bility of sectors deemed
to be at risk of carbon
leakage should be taken
seriously.
12. Auctioning
allowances is typically
more efficient and trans-
parent than allocating
free allowances. First,
double dividends might
arise (see section 1.5).
Second, in systems with
continued free alloca-
tion, companies typi-
cally have incentives to
delay emission reduc-
tion decisions in order to
increase their future
allocation of valuable
allowances.
Table 3: Indicative table for allocation
FR DE HU IT PL ES UK
Auction revenues – + – + –
Free allowances + +
Banking + – –
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worse off. However, decisions on
the allocation of free allowances,
though formally linked to the sec-
toral or product level, also have
implications for the distribution of
benefits to member states. We find
that, although countries are
affected to very different degrees
by the ETS, the most-affected
countries are largely compensated
by the allocation of free
allowances and auction revenues.
The complexity of the economic
effects make perfect compensa-
tion at the member-state level
impossible. Consequently, deci-
sions with a distributional dimen-
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